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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between competition, innovation and productivity
for the Netherlands. We use industry level data aggregated from micro data as well
as moments from firm level data for the period 1996-2006. We match innovation data
from Community Innovation Survey with accounting data to link innovative activities
with performance at the industry level. We find strong evidence for a positive impact
of competition on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) at the industry level. Competition
directly increases TFP by reducing X-inefficiencies and removing inefficient firms from
markets, but also through more innovation. Nonetheless, there exists an inverted U-
curve between competition and innovation for the Netherlands, at least for manufacturing
industries. Yet, our results indicate that a negative effect of competition on productivity
through lower innovation expenditures arises only at very high levels of competition.
Keywords: competition, innovation, profit elasticity, productivity
JEL classification: D40, L16, O31
∗Financial support from NWO (grant numbers 453.03.606 and 472.04.031) is gratefully acknowledged.
Thanks to Jan Boone, Roel van Elk, Bert Minne and Ruud Okker for their comments on earlier versions
of this paper. We are also grateful to Rob Alessie for his excellent econometric advice. The data analysis
reported in this document was carried out at the Centre for Policy Related Statistics of Statistics Netherlands.
The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy of
Statistics Netherlands.
†PricewaterhouseCoopers, Department of Economics, Tilburg University, CentER and Tilec. Email:
e.brouwer@uvt.nl.
‡Department of Economics, Tilburg University, CentER and CPB. Email: hvdw@cpb.nl.
1
1. Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between competition, innovation and productivity at the
industry level for the Netherlands. In the view of the endogenous growth theory (see e.g.,
Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Aghion and Howitt (2006)), competition and
innovation are interrelated and as such seen as important determinants for productivity and in
that way contributing to sustained economic growth. And economic growth is a fundamental
driver of improving the living standards of the population (i.e. the welfare level).
For the Netherlands, this relationship is especially interesting since for many years its perfor-
mance on productivity growth is relatively poor in an international (and historical) perspective,
particularly compared to the US, pushing the Netherlands back in its top-ranking with regard
to the level of productivity (see e.g., van der Wiel (2001), Gelauff, Klomp, Raes and Roelandt
(2004), Kegels, Peneder and van der Wiel (2008) and van der Wiel, Creusen, van Leeuwen and
van der Pijll (2008)). In that respect, it is not surprising that Dutch policy intends to foster
productivity by using policy measures that aim to stimulate either innovation or competition
to realize higher welfare.
However, as Nickell (1996) already mentioned more than ten years ago, the theoretical and
empirical evidence that competition improves the productivity performance are not overwhelm-
ing. Moreover, the study by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005) for the UK
finds that the relationship between competition and innovation is an inverted U. In that case, a
trade-off between both drivers of productivity may exist and innovation policy and competition
policy can be at odds with each other when focussed on realizing higher productivity: stimu-
lating competition beyond a certain level might then have a negative effect on innovation, and
subsequently on productivity. But empirical evidence is scarce. State of the art research on
the empirical relation between competition and innovation as Aghion et al. (2005) did for the
UK has not been done for Dutch industries yet, let alone the impact on productivity. Hence,
we do not know whether there exists an inverted U curve for the Netherlands, and if so, which
industries have competition intensities beyond the innovation maximizing level.
This paper picks up this ambiguous connection between competition and innovation, and relates
it to Dutch productivity. We apply an empirical framework that is comparable with Nickell
(1996), Griffith, Redding and van Reenen (2004) and Griffith, Harrison and Simpson (2006).
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We start from the idea of a production function taking on board views from the endogenous
growth theory. Hence, our framework includes the impact competition and innovation have on
productivity performance. In the vein of the convergence literature, the distance to the global
frontier – as being the highest attainable productivity – level may also be relevant because
this may signal potentials for productivity growth through (costless) technology transfers or
knowledge spillovers. Recent studies from, for instance, Griffith et al. (2004) and Conway, Rosa,
Nicoletti and Steiner (2006) emphasize the importance of technology transfers and the effect
of product market regulations on the international diffusion of productivity shocks given the
distance to the frontier. Moreover, our framework both explains changes in competition and
innovation, and it provides insight in how the interaction mechanism between competition and
innovation works in practice knowing that they are endogenous.
We use data from two sources. First, we employ industry level data from the Production Survey
(PS) for more than 150 3-digit SIC-industries directly based on aggregated Dutch firm level
data covering almost the whole Dutch economy over the period 1993-2006.1 Second, we employ
innovation indicators from six consecutive Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) covering the
period 1996-2006. Moreover, the industry level data is augmented with information from firm
level data on variances. Industry averages are sums ignoring firm heterogeneity within an
industry, while this is increasingly seen as important in the endogenous growth literature (see
e.g., Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and Aghion and Howitt (2006)). As we have firm level data
at our disposal, we add measures of variances between firms to our analysis at the industry
level to take heterogeneity of firms into account. An example is the distance to the frontier.
To some extent, the ambiguous message from the empirical literature on the relationship be-
tween competition and innovation is related to the difficulty in measuring both concepts and
the availability of adequate data. Moreover, from a modeling perspective, both competition
and innovation are endogenous and this complicates estimation of their impact on productiv-
ity. Other factors may determine competition and innovation like policy measures and macro
economic shocks. Additionally, competition may affect innovation as well, but innovation may
also change the market structure and the degree of competition through product differentia-
tion. Hence, we have reverse causality and encounter endogeneity problems. We address these
problems using Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM). This estimation technique exploits
1For a number of industries, we use 4-digit SIC-industries.
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lagged explanatory variables as instruments to cope with endogeneity.
Our main findings are the following. We show that competition and to a lesser extent innovation
are good for productivity. But here it is important to take into account the relationship between
competition and innovation. We provide support for the view that there exists an inverted U-
curve between competition and innovation for the Netherlands, at least for the manufacturing
sector. This corresponds with findings of Aghion et al. (2005). As there can be a trade-off
between both, our findings have implications for policy because competition and innovation
might be in conflict. However, we show that the overall results indicate that a negative effect
of competition on productivity through lower innovation arises only at very high levels of
competition. Hence when it comes to productivity, more intense competition is almost always
better.
This study contributes to the (empirical) literature in different ways. First, it examines the
existence of an inverted-U curve between competition and innovation for the Netherlands. Be-
sides the study of Aghion et al. (2005), empirical evidence for such inverted U-curve is scarce.2
Second, compared to Aghion et al. (2005), we use better measures for competition and innova-
tion. Aghion et al. (2005) applies the price cost margin (PCM) and patent citation as indicators
for competition and innovation respectively. Both indicators have severe shortcomings. We use
the profit elasticity (PE) and the innovation rate as those indicators are more robust (see e.g.,
Boone, van Ours and van der Wiel (2007), Kleinknecht, van Montfoort and Brouwer (2002)
and Brouwer (2007)). Moreover, our study analyzes the entire economy, whereas Aghion et al.
(2005) only look at manufacturing industries. We also have data for other industries like ser-
vices. Third, we explicitly consider the effect of competition and innovation on productivity,
since the latter is one of the main goals for policy makers as productivity is directly related
to welfare. As far as we are aware of, there is no comparable study in this respect. Finally,
we control for possible feedback mechanism from innovation to competition taking account of
other explanatory variables.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief theoretical background of
the relationship between competition, innovation and productivity. The empirical framework,
2See Creusen, Minne and van der Wiel (2006b) for an analysis of the inverted-U curve for only the Dutch
retail trade.
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econometric specification and endogeneity problems are discussed in section 3. Next, section 4
introduces the data sources and the key variables in question. It also presents some descriptive
statistics. Section 5 contains the results of estimating the relationship between competition,
innovation and productivity. This section also examines the robustness of these results with
respect to our competition indicator. Finally, section 6 summarizes the main findings and
sketches policy implications.
2. Theoretical and empirical background
2.1. Theoretical background competition and innovation
Traditional views competition and innovation
Let us first have a closer look at the separate effects of competition and innovation on pro-
ductivity. In theory, investments in R&D create new technologies and new products, both
generating higher productivity, or stated otherwise: more value added per worker (see e.g.,
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Cameron (1998), Griliches (1998) and Cameron and Trivedi
(2005)). The general finding in empirics is that innovation is good for productivity (see, inter
alia, van Leeuwen (2009)).
The intensity of competition is also important for economic growth (see e.g., Geroski (1990)
and Nickell (1996)). This can be found in theory and empirics.3 The story goes as follows.
Competition on product markets is generally seen as generating lower prices for consumers and
higher quality. Competitive pressure stimulates firms to operate efficiently by, for instance,
cutting the fat out of their organizations. Or, more intense competition forces inefficient firms
to leave the market. It brings product prices in line with their marginal costs, lowering the
rents of producers and increasing consumer surplus. Vigorous product market competition
may therefore result in higher productivity as resources and output are allocated to their most
productive use.
However, taking into account the interplay between (product market) competition and inno-
vation, economic theory does not predict the shape of this relationship nor how competition
3Exceptions are Scharfstein (1988) and Martin (1993), they argue that competition leads to an increase in
managerial slack, and hence lowers productivity.
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affects productivity and economic growth through innovation. Whether or not competition
raises innovation is an ongoing debate and a challenging research topic since Schumpeter’s re-
marks in two famous books, dividing the theoretical strands into two camps. The first strand
consists of those that argue that competition is bad for innovation (see Schumpeter (1942)).
The second strand claims that competition is good for innovation (see Schumpeter (1934)).
According to Schumpeter (1942) fiercer competition generates less R&D, reducing the rate
of innovation and hence economic growth. The intuition is that because the expectation of high
profits drives innovation, an increase in competition will discourage innovation if it results in
lower profits. The Industrial Organization literature of product differentiation and monopolistic
competition supports this strand (see Salop (1979) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)). Using a
Schumpeterian endogenous growth model, Aghion and Howitt (1992) show that an increase
in product market competition has a negative effect on productivity growth by reducing the
monopoly rents that reward innovation (see also Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman
(1991)). Examples of empirical studies that support this negative correlation are Hamberg
(1964), Mansfield (1964), Kraft (1989), Porter (1990) and Symeonidis (2001).
The view that competition is good for innovation, is theoretically supported by studies from
Schumpeter (1934), Arrow (1962) and Scherer (1980). In this strand, it is thought that compe-
tition stimulates an incumbent to innovate otherwise the firm is forced to leave the market and
the potential entrant will win the race. This entrant will win this race if the replacement effect
(Arrow (1962)) for the incumbent is stronger than its efficiency effect.4 When innovating the
incumbent monopolist replaces her own profits while the potential entrant has no pre profits to
replace at all. Aghion and Howitt (1999) show these mechanisms in a theoretical model. More
intense competition raises innovation activities, because it reduces incumbent’s pre-innovation
profits more than it lowers its post innovation profits. The empirical evidence for this second
strand is larger than for the first strand. We refer to studies like Geroski (1990), Nickell (1996),
Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1995), Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1999) and Car-
lin, Schaffer and Seabright (2004) that find a positive relationship between competition and
innovation (or productivity).
4When the monopolist does not innovate, he loses his current monopoly profits. This gives an incentive for
the monopolist to innovate.
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Recent view: nonlinear relation competition and innovation
Having both a positive and a negative relationship in the literature, the third strand in the
debate is predictable: the connection between competition and innovation can be characterized
as an inverted U-shape. Reconciling theory and empirical evidence, Aghion et al. (2005) develop
a model where low (high) levels of competition have a positive (negative) effect on innovation.5
The intuition behind this inverted-U is as follows. There are two types of competition effects
on innovation: escape competition effect and Schumpeterian effect.
In case of low levels of competition, the escape competition effect dominates. While prein-
novation profits are reduced, increasing competition will raise the incentive of neck-and-neck
firms to innovate because firms become the single front technology if they innovate. But if com-
petition further intensifies, the balance between the two effects changes and the Schumpeterian
effect (i.e. fiercer competition generates less R&D) will start to dominate, generating the neg-
ative part of the inverted-U curve between competition and innovation. Further increases in
competition reduce the (post)innovation rents for laggard firms to become neck-and-neck with
the leader again.
Hence, the inverted-U relationship arises due to a change in the composition of firms. Ini-
tially when competition is low, industries are most often leveled. So if competition increases
industries become more frequently unleveled, whereas the chance that they become leveled
again reduces as for laggards it is increasingly difficult and costly to catch up. Stated other-
wise, when competition is really fierce hardly any industry will remain leveled. Consequently,
as the innovation rate is lower in unleveled situations, beyond some level of competition, inno-
vation will decline, generating the inverted U. Moreover, Aghion et al. (2005) add the idea of
neck-and-neck industries (or firms) where the difference in performance is small across firms as
they have the same technology, whereas in ‘leader-follower’ industries firms have different tech-
nologies and, hence, different productivity levels. Due to more neck-and-neckness, the inverted
U becomes steeper as the escape competition is larger.
Such inverted U-curve between competition and innovation can also occur in another way as
there can be a trade-off between process and product innovation as well when competition is
raised (see Boone (2000b)). At the industry level, this may then generate an inverted U-curve
5Note that it was Scherer (1967) who for the first time came up with the idea of an inverted-U relationship.
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if total innovation expenditures (i.e. process and product outlays) are considered.
Boone (2000b) shows that a rise in competition may raise industrywide efficiency through
more process innovation. But, this may reduce product variety or the number of products in-
troduced to the market: less product innovation. The reason is that when competition becomes
more intense, inefficient firms are forced to leave the market as a result of the selection effect
of competition and lower costs of opponents (higher efficiency level from process innovation).
This reduces the product variety (or product innovations) in this market. Moreover, more com-
petition reduces profits and makes it for some firms less attractive to introduce a new product.
Hence, a trade off may occur between process and product innovations at the aggregate level.
There are, however, two possibilities that may overturn this trade off. First, firms could
also escape competition by product differentiation, and hence creating their own niches (see
also van der Wiel (2010)). Second, lower profits due to more competitive pressure could act as
a wake up call for managers. To avoid bankruptcy, managers have to look for new products
that can generate additional profits. Hence, although process innovation is applied industry-
wide, innovation expenditures with respect to product innovation might go up as well in that
particular industry.
The empirical evidence for an inverted U-shape between competition and innovation is scarce.6
Besides Aghion et al. (2005), only Scott (1984) and Kilponen and Santavirta (2007) found
significant evidence in favor of this form. For instance, the latter examines this relationship
for the manufacturing companies in Finland between the years 1990 and 2001. In contrast,
tested on a data set of Swedish firms, Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) find that the inverted-U
relationship relation between competition and R&D is by PCM. Further, using firm level data
Creusen, Minne and van der Wiel (2006b) tested the inverted U-shape for the Dutch retail
trade but their results also rejected this view. Finally, Griffith et al. (2006) find no evidence
for an inverted U-curve looking at an unbalanced panel of nine countries and 12 two-digit
manufacturing industries over the period 1987-2000.
The following summarizes this section. Positive as wells as negative effects from competition
on innovation can be found in theory and empirics, while recent literature suggests an inverse
U relation between competition and innovation. Consequently, the implications for produc-
6Below in subsection 2.3, we show that this finding might also depend on the indicators used for competition
and innovation.
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tivity are similar: effects can be positive and negative. But recent theory indirectly provides
indications that fiercer competition is always good for productivity. As a matter of fact, from
Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl (2006) one can deduct that a decline in innova-
tion expenditures (of incumbents) in an industry can go hand in hand with higher aggregate
productivity of that particular industry. The reason is that after intensifying competition, the
least efficient domestic firm has no incentive anymore to imitate or to innovate due to the large
productivity gap to the technological frontier. So the innovation expenditures of that industry
decline. Yet it can be proved that aggregate productivity of that industry rises (see Kocsis,
Lukach, Minne, Shestalova, Zubanov and van der Wiel (2009)). The reason is the entry of a
foreign leader with the highest productivity level in that particular industry. That foreign firm
replaces the least efficient domestic firm increasing aggregate productivity, but this entry is not
seen (in statistics) as an innovation.
2.2. Further extension endogenous growth literature: distance to frontier
Following up on the fundamentals of earlier work of Aghion and Howitt (see Aghion and Howitt
(1992) and Aghion and Howitt (1999)), the idea has been postulated that the distance to the
technological frontier (i.e. the technology giving the highest possible level of output given the
inputs) matters for countries or industries. For example, Aghion and Howitt (2006) describe a
model where the growth performance of a country (or industry) also depends on its proximity
to the technological frontier and what both innovation and competition mean in this respect.
A similar story can be told for the interaction between entry and the distance to the frontier.
In this model (see Aghion et al. (2006)), entry threat is an exogenous parameter which measures
the probability that a (foreign) firm enters the (home) market. The results of this model are
the following. The impact of entry on innovation is non-uniform across firms and industries.
Higher threat of entry leads to higher innovation expenditures and higher productivity growth
of incumbents, which are already highly efficient (i.e. firms close to the frontier). These firms
innovate more to prevent entry. However, increased entry (threat) discourages less efficient
incumbents (i.e. firms far below the frontier) to spend on innovation. The reason for the
heterogeneity in the incumbents’ response to the entry threat is simple: while the costs of
innovation are the same for all firms, the market leaders have a higher chance of retaining their
leadership in the face of entry than the laggards have of gaining it.
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2.3. Empirical issues
Linking competition, innovation and productivity is not only from a theoretical perspective an
unsettled issue. Dealing with it in practice is a challenging case too and still in its infancy. The
ambiguous empirical results with regard to competition and innovation may partly be related
to doubtful indicators for competition and innovation. Two questions are highly ranked on the
research agenda: (i) How to measure competition?, and (ii) how to measure innovation?
In the empirical literature, competition is often measured with variables like concentration,
profitability, price cost margins (see e.g., Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986), Blundell
et al. (1995), Blundell et al. (1999), Nickell (1996), and Aghion et al. (2005)). Boone (2000a)
and Boone et al. (2007) have shown that these competition measures are not monotone in
competition. When competition intensifies due to more aggressive interaction between firms,
the industry PCM may rise suggesting less competition. The reason is that PCM increases
as a result of the reallocation of market shares from inefficient firms (with low mark ups) to
efficient firms (with high mark ups). This paper uses, therefore, the profit elasticity (PE) as
indicator for competition. This measure relates the firm’s profit to its efficiency that can be
captured by average variable costs. The intuition behind this indicator is that inefficient firms
are punished more severely in terms of their profits when competition intensifies. This measure
of competition is monotone for different parameterizations of competition (see e.g., Boone et al.
(2007) and Boone, van Ours and van der Wiel (2010)).
This paper employs the innovation intensity – innovation expenditures over employees – as
indicator for the innovation activities instead of, for instance, R&D expenditures or patents.
We do not use the R&D measure as this measure does not cover all the innovative efforts
of firms.7 The definition of innovation expenditures we use, is much wider than the one for
R&D that is often used in the studies mentioned above. Our innovation indicator consists of,
amongst others, costs of patent application, wages of R&D personnel, exploitation costs, and
capital expenditure on buildings and equipment for R&D.
The same limitations pertains to the number of (applied for) patents or cited patents as
indicator for innovation. This indicator is for example used in Aghion et al. (2005) and Kilponen
and Santavirta (2007). The problem, here, is that not every innovative firm applies for a
patent due to, amongst others, high costs of application and the desire to keep the innovation
7In our data set, the R&D expenditures are not even half as much as the innovation expenditures.
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secret. This shortcoming is particularly relevant in non-manufacturing industries that we want
to analyze as well. Innovations in (particular) services can hardly be patent. Hence, these
industries should then be excluded from further analysis if an innovation measure based on
patents is used or these industries are seen as non innovating industries in the analysis and,
consequently, underestimating the extent of innovation.8
Finally, the studies from Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) and Aghion et al. (2005) illustrate that the
results of the inverted U-shaped relation between competition and innovation can be sensitive
to either the choice of competition measures or the innovation indicator. Tingvall and Poldahl
(2006) find strong support for the inverted-U relationship using the Herfinfahl index (H). How-
ever, if this concentration indicator is replaced by PCM, then they do not find support for this
form. Similarly, Aghion et al. (2005) do not find a statistically significant inverted U-shape
when they use R&D-expenditures as indicator for innovation. Below we test the sensitivity of
our results for using different competition measures.
3. Econometric specifications
3.1. Empirical framework
The basic idea in our framework is that both competition and innovation are major determinants
of productivity, and productivity is one of the main goals for policy as productivity is the direct
link to welfare.9
Our empirical model consists of components of studies from Nickell (1996), Griffith et al. (2004)
and Griffith et al. (2006). It integrates the views of existing literature such as the two faces of
R&D, the convergence debate and the existence of firm level heterogeneity in productivity.
We start with a production function taking on board mechanisms from endogenous growth
8For instance, Kilponen and Santavirta (2007) excluded the industries without any US patents.
9Similar to innovation and competition, human capital (or human skills) may have an impact on productivity.
Seen as another input factor in the production process, human capital might help to speed up technology
absorption and stimulating innovation. Sianesi and van Reenen (2003) provide a comprehensive overview of
empirical studies on the effects of human capital on growth. However, in this paper, we ignore human capital
as driver of productivity, because we have no data on human capital.
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theory that both innovation and competition matter for economic growth. Therefore, in con-
trast to Nickell (1996) who focuses on the impact of competition on productivity, our model also
includes the impact of innovation on productivity performance. As Griffith et al. (2004), we
take into account views from the convergence literature and the role of the so called two faces of
R&D (see also Cohen and Levinthal (1989)), where convergence between countries/industries
depends on the absorption capacity of knowledge spillovers.10 Finally, as competition and
innovation are both endogenous variables, we explain these variables separately in our model.11
Productivity equation
Assume that each industry j produces in period t according to a standard neoclassical produc-
tion technology





where Y is (real) output, K denotes capital, L is labor, and A indicates total factor productivity
(TFP). We assume that the elasticities of capital and labor (i.e. α and β) exhibit diminishing
marginal returns to the accumulation of each factor alone and these elasticities are constant over
time and across industries.12 A is allowed to increase over time. Taking the natural logarithm,
we write equation (1) as a decomposition of labor productivity (LP) growth into contributions
of the capital intensity, the shifts in the industry’s size (in terms of employed staff) and A13
∆lpjt ≡ ∆yjt − ∆ljt = ∆ajt + α (∆kjt − ∆ljt) + (α + β − 1) ∆ljt (2)
Note that the parameter on industry size (i.e. labor) determines whether the firms in industry
j can benefit from increasing economies of scale (i.e. if α + β − 1 > 0).
The view of the endogenous growth theory that innovation and competition matter for growth
enters our equation through A (see e.g., Romer (1990), Griliches (1998), Aghion and Howitt
(1992), Nickell (1996), Griffith et al. (2004) and Aghion et al. (2006)).14 Taking a closer look
10Notice that Griffith et al. (2004) neglect competition issues.
11Competition determines innovation. But there may also be reverse causality as innovation may affect
competition.
12That is: α, β ∈< 0, 1 >.
13Lower case letters mean logarithm of the variables concerned.
14In the endogenous growth literature, there is an ongoing debate about semi- versus endogenous growth
theory (i.e. Schumpeterian growth theory). Roughly speaking, according to the semi endogenous growth
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at the determinants of A (or TFP), we assume that industries may enhance their productivity
growth in four ways.
First, based on theory, we expect that fierce competition forces firms in a particular industry
to reduce ‘X inefficiencies’, and consequently affects productivity in the short term (see for
instance Nickell (1996), for an overview). Weak competition makes managers and employees
lax, or even seduces managers and employees to shirk.
Second, based on the convergence literature, the Schumpeterian growth theory takes into
account the distance to the technological frontier as a measure of the potential for technology
transfer. The larger the distance is the further firms lie behind the frontier and the greater the
potential of productivity growth through technology transfers within an industry. For instance,
Griffith et al. (2004), Conway et al. (2006) and van der Wiel et al. (2008) empirically show that
the distance to the frontier matters for productivity growth. We examine whether or not this
‘gap’(=g) also affects growth rates of TFP.
Third, innovation might have a direct impact on the rate of TFP growth by conducting
R&D to develop new process technologies and/or new products (so called first face of R&D).
Although, knowledge has the characteristics of a public good (knowledge spillovers), changes
in TFP require real resources in terms of R&D (and human capital) to exploit those knowledge
spillovers, but also to generate knowledge in the first place.
Finally, it can be argued that the ability of a firm (or industry) to benefit from knowledge
spillovers depends on its own level of R&D activities and the distance behind the technological
frontier. This idea is developed by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), who established the concept
of the ‘two faces of R&D’. In fact, R&D activities play two roles. On the one hand, R&D
activities generate innovations. On the other hand, R&D improves the ability of a firm to
identify, assimilate and exploit outside knowledge. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) label this as
the learning or absorptive capacity of the firm. The absorptive capacity is largely a function of
the firm’s level of prior knowledge (see also Griffith et al. (2004)).
Going back to our model and include the preceding elements, we first assume that A depends on
the stock of knowledge (S) and the intensity of competition (C). Industries with a larger (R&D)
models one should estimate a productivity equation in levels, whereas according to the endogenous growth
theory one should estimate growth rates. See Madsen (2008) for a further discussion and why (time-series)
evidence is more favorable for the Schumpeterian growth theory using growth rates.
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knowledge stock or more intense competition have a higher level of TFP. Taking logarithms
and differencing with regard to time, the rate of A depends on the growth rate of S and the
change in C and X
∆ajt = ν0∆sjt + ν1∆cjt−1 + ν2∆xjt−1 (3)
with ν0 > 0, ν1 > 0 and X is a vector of control variables which (in theory) may include other
(exogenous) explanatory variables that affect TFP-growth like non-technological innovations or
spillovers from outside the industry. We assume that competition and those other determinants
do not directly affect TFP but with a lag. In doing so, we also eliminate already some of the
endogeneity bias in our framework.
Combining equations (3) and (A.2, see appendix A) gives an expression for TFP which depends
on competition as well as innovation, and on a vector of control variables
∆ajt = µ1 IRjt−1 + ν1 ∆cjt−1 + ν2∆xjt−1 (4)
where IR is innovation intensity. Implementing equation (4) in the productivity equation (2),
we obtain:
∆lpjt = µ1IRjt−1 + ν1∆cjt−1 + ν2∆xjt−1 + α (∆kjt − ∆ljt) + (α + β − 1) ∆ljt (5)
Finally, we include the distance to the frontier and the second face of R&D to this equation.
Summarizing we have:
∆lpjt = µ1IRjt−1 + ν1∆cjt−1 + δ1gjt−1 + δ2gjt−1IRjt−1 + δ3gjt−1∆cjt−1 + ν2∆xjt−1
+ α (∆kjt − ∆ljt) + (α+ β − 1) ∆ljt + T t + εjt (6)
where g = ln(Af/A). This term captures the gap and in that sense the potential technology
transfers from the technological frontier (Af).
15 To estimate this equation, we add an error
term (εjt) to this equation assuming that this is serially uncorrelated. Moreover, we include
time dummies T to control for macroeconomics shocks that affect TFP in all industries.
Innovation equation
15The pace of this catch up depends on the size of the estimated coefficient δ. For instance, patents may
hamper spillovers and lower this coefficient.
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What determines innovation? According to Tingvall and Poldahl (2006), there is no explicit
theoretical model with preferred explanatory variables. From section 2 we infer that competition
is important. The degree of competitive pressure affects the amount of investment in innovation.
Following Aghion et al. (2005) the nonlinear relation between competition and innovative effort
can be estimated by regressing the innovation rate of each industry on a quadratic function of
competition intensity in the respective industry. Then the equation for the innovation rate for
industry j in period t is
IRjt = ϕ1Cjt−1 + ϕ2C
2
jt−1 + ϕ3Wjt−1 + Tt + ψjt (7)
with W being other determinants of innovation like policy measures in the form of subsidies
and the possibilities of cooperation between firms. We use lags as we assume that the impact
of our explanatory variables takes some time to affect innovation. We also add an error term
(ψ) and time dummies to this equation.
Theory provides some guidance for the parameters ϕ1 and ϕ2 as discussed in section 2. If
ϕ1 > 0 then for ∆C close to zero, the dominant effect is escape competition: firms innovate more
when competition intensifies. In contrast, ϕ1 < 0 then for ∆C close to zero, the Schumpeter
effect dominates the effect of competition on innovation. In this case, competition discourages
the innovative efforts of an industry as (laggard) firms find it difficult to reap the benefits of
these efforts. But following Aghion et al. (2005) this relationship may also be nonlinear with
ϕ1 > 0 and ϕ2 < 0.
16 If competition is low then competition is conducive to IR, whereas if
competition is high then competition may discourage IR.
Competition equation
Given the complexity of modeling competition, our aim here is to estimate a simple equation
relating competition to a number of determinants at the industry level.17 We model competition
as follows
Cjt = λ1IRjt−1 + λ2IR
2
jt−1 + λ3Zjt−1 + Tt + ζjt (8)
with Z a vector of other explanatory variables discussed below. Theory has put forward several
(exogenous) determinants of competition (see e.g., Tirole (1988), Cabral (2000) and Boone
16The downward sloping part of the inverted U-shape occurs beyond the level of C where: 2ϕ2C > ϕ1.
17As far as we know, empirical research that may serve as a reference is scarce (see Creusen, Minne and
van der Wiel (2006a) for one of the exceptions).
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(2000a)). Some of these determinants are related to market structure of industries and conduct
of firms. Given our available data, Z includes variables that are linked to strategic entry barriers
such as advertising costs and number of firms that enter and exit the market.18
We put I into equation (8) to take account of a possible feedback mechanism from innovation
back to the intensity of competition at the industry level. The idea is that the higher the
competition intensity in an industry, the higher the incentive for firms to reduce the competition
intensity by differentiating their products from that of their competitors by creating niches.
Hence, when the outlays for product innovation increase, this may eventually have a negative
effect on the degree of competition. We use a one year lag as to take into account that our
innovation indicator is an input measure and does not directly affect the extent of competition.
3.2. Industry averages and heterogeneity of firms
As explained below, this paper uses industry level data to limit the complexity of the econo-
metric model. These industry data are averages based sums from firm level data.
However, we do not completely ignore information based on firm level data because it is
well known that firms are heterogenous in their innovative efforts (see e.g., Bartelsman and
Doms (2000), van der Wiel and van Leeuwen (2003), Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta
(2004) and van Leeuwen (2009)). This paper therefore links firm level data to industry level
data to take account of the possibility of different responses of firms instead of assuming a
representative firm response within an industry.19 First, we already discussed the importance
of the distance to the frontier as driver of industry’s productivity growth. Having firm level data
at our disposal, we can consider the relevance of this issue. Second, we also control for variances
in efficiency per industry. More precisely, we add the variance of the average variable costs as
control variable to the innovation equation (7) and to the productivity equation (6). The
reasoning is that, at high levels of competitions, firms will adopt or use the existing technology
quicker/better if the variation is small than when it is large (i.e. reducing X-inefficiencies).20
Moreover, we relate this difference in efficiency to the extent to which industries are neck-
and-neck. Aghion et al. (2005) argue that when industries are more neck-and-neck (i.e. lower
18Notice that these variables are not exogenous themselves.
19This is an interesting field for further research. As firm level data is most often confidential, statistical
offices could add moments of variables based on firm level data without violating confidentiality. This opens a
new dimension for research at the industry level.
20We do not include this variable into the competition equation due to probably high collinearity.
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variance in efficiency across firms, or stated otherwise, firms operate at similar technological
levels) the more positive the effect of competition on innovation. If variance is high, then an
increase in competition will have a stronger negative effect on innovation. All in all, the peak
of inverted U will be higher and occurs at a higher level of competition.21
3.3. Econometric issues
One difficulty in analyzing the relationship between competition and innovation is that both
factors are not exogenous. In fact, competition might even be endogenous due to reverse
causality with innovation. To illustrate, innovation can affect competition in two ways. First,
high R&D-investments can reduce entry as if other firms have to follow this they form a barrier
to entry thereby reducing competition (see Sutton (1991)). Second, innovation can take the
form of product differentiation thereby reducing competition by creating niches and by making
goods less perfect substitutes (see Boone (2000b)).
The study of Aghion et al. (2005) uses a set of policy instruments to cope with the endogene-
ity of competition due to innovation. These instruments (e.g., privatization, EU Single Market
Program, and Monopoly and Merger Commission investigations) are based on the introduction
of policy changes across industries. These changes are likely exogenous because they are not
related to innovation performance. Unfortunately, a similar data set with policy changes is
currently not available for the Netherlands. We need another approach.
We use GMM estimation technique to cope with endogeneity problems. GMM exploits
lagged explanatory variables as instruments after the equation has been differenced to eliminate
unobserved fixed effects. To be more precise, our model consists of the three earlier mentioned
equations: productivity, innovation and competition in equations (6), (7) and 8 respectively.
These equations are estimated in first differences and all right hand side variables in our model
are lagged with one year. Subsequently, the endogenous variables on the right hand side are
instrumented with all the exogenous variables of the model including the second and third
lagged of the endogenous variables themselves. Of course every instrument is the same for
each endogenous variables on the right side. The first-stage regressions, where we estimate the
21Aghion et al. (2005) state that the fraction of sectors with neck-and-neck competitors is itself endogenous,
depending upon equilibrium innovation intensities. But, in our view, lower variance could also be the result
of intensifying competition selecting the best performing firms from inefficient firms and making the difference
between the remaining firms smaller.
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endogenous variables on the right hand side with the instruments, are tested with the Hansen’s
J test (test of over identifying restriction) and the GMM C statistic (test of endogeneity).
GMM estimation technique is to be preferred above for instance IV-techniques in the fol-
lowing situations. In case of heteroskedasticity the IV-estimates of the standard errors are
inconsistent, and also the tests for endogeneity and overidentifying restrictions are then invalid
(see Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003)). When facing heteroskedasticity of unknown form,
GMM is the estimation approach. GMM makes use of the orthogonality conditions to allow for
efficient estimation in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form (see Hansen (1982)).
One of the advantages of GMM is also that it can estimate the coefficients in a model without
solving the model analytically (Verbeek (2004)). Therefore we can estimate our three equations
separately.
For this analysis, we use industry level data instead of firm level data because we are then able
to estimate our complete model with fixed effects regressions and instruments using GMM. We
see this analysis as a first step to analyze firm level data in future research. An analysis of that
type encounters a number of (econometric) challenges to deal with that we now can circumvent
using industry level data. For instance many firms do not innovate at all, because of that a
Tobit or Heckman model combined with two fixed effects regression equations for the other two
equations is required. Also estimating a fixed effect Tobit is not that easy as extra assumptions
are needed. Finally, at the firm level we have many missing observations for innovation mainly
because all firms below 50 employees are sampled in the innovation survey (see below) and there
is not much of a chance that a firm is present in the sample for the entire observed period.22
4. Data description
4.1. Data sources
We use a number of data sources. The most important ones are: Production Survey (PS) and
Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Both sources are surveys from Statistics Netherlands and
based on firm level data. Below, we briefly describe these two main sources of information in
more detail.
22Moreover, firms above 50 employees might be missing due to non response.
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PS
Data on, for instance, labor productivity is derived from PS, produced by Statistics Netherlands
on a yearly basis. Data from PS is available for the years 1993 to 2006.23 The PS is a sampled
survey; only firms with more than 20 employees are included in the sample each year. For
smaller firms, sampling fractions decrease, and consequently most smaller firms will have gaps
in the data for several years. Moreover, Statistics Netherlands apply a rotating sample method
to reduce the administrative burden of (small) firms. This also reduces consecutive observations
of firms.
CIS
Data on innovation expenditures has been gathered from the Dutch section of CIS. CIS is a Eu-
ropean harmonized questionnaire, held every two years, containing questions about innovative
activities in enterprizes. Our innovation data covers the period 1996-2006. In fact, we use six
consecutive CIS-surveys: i.e. CIS2 for 1994-1996, CIS2,5 for 1996-1998, CIS3 for 1998-2000,
CIS3,5 for 2000-2002, CIS4 for 2002-2004, and CIS2005 for 2004-2006. CIS samples firms below
50 employees. Firms with less than ten employees are not included.
A main advantage of CIS is that after merging with PS one can directly relate firms’ innovation
activities to their performance and input factors. Yet CIS has shortcomings that limit the
options for research. We mention the most important ones. First, the number of observations
in CIS is low compared to that of PS due to a more limited sampling technique including
different threshold for sampling (i.e. 50 versus 20 employees). This narrows the matching
with PS. Additionally, CIS contains industries that are not present in PS and vice versa.
This reduces the number of industries that can be examined. Second, CIS suffers from lower
response rates and the responses can be selective as it is most likely that innovative firms are
more inclined to respond than firms that do not innovate. Finally, CIS does not capture all
issues of innovation. For example, information on human capital formation is not included.24
Also, new firms entering the market are initially not included in the sample, while these firms
may enter the market because they are innovative.
Taking the caveats of our sources for granted, after aggregating firm level data to industry
level data, we merged the two data sources at the 3 (and sometimes 4) digit SIC-code in order
23Data for the industries transport and telecom only covers the period 2000-2006.
24Some European countries like Finland do take human capital issues into account.
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to obtain information over the period 1996-2006, and in order to be able to construct lagged
exogenous variables that we need for our estimation technique later on. Because we do not
have CIS data in odd years, we lose observations. To keep enough observations, we interpolate
the innovation data which may reintroduce some endogeneity.25
4.2. Variables
This subsection discusses the definitions of our dependent variables and the explanatory vari-
ables respectively that we use for estimating the equations for productivity, innovation and
competition.
Labor productivity
Labor productivity is defined as gross value added per employee, and is derived from PS.
Innovation intensity
The expenditure on innovation divided by the number of employees is used as a measure of the
innovation intensity of an industry.26 As explained in equation (A.2), we use a ratio and this
ratio comes from CIS. The innovation expenditures consist of the total costs of both contracted
R&D and intramural R&D, including wages, exploitation costs, and capital expenditure on
buildings and equipment for R&D.27
Measures of competition
With the data at hand there are several routes open for measuring competition. In this paper we
use PE, (see Boone et al. (2007)). This measure results from an econometric specification that
relates profits to efficiency captured by the average variable costs. This regression is applied
to firms belonging to one and the same market (or industry). The parameter of this regression
measures PE and comparing this parameter over time enables us to make inferences on changes
in competition. The main idea of PE is that fiercer competition enables efficient firms to earn
25We use a linear interpolation. Besides having less observations, if we do not interpolate it is hardly possible
to use GMM as we need observations for the years t, t − 1 and t − 2.
26We do not use sales in the denominator because, it turned out that the sales from CIS were not reliable.
An alternative not applied here is to use the sales from the PS.
27Although the difference between product and process innovation expenditures can be important from a
theoretical perspective (see Boone (2000b)), we cannot distinguish between both concepts as CIS does not
provide separate figures for either product or process innovation expenditures.
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relatively higher profits than their inefficient competitors. PE measures the percentage fall in
a firm’s profits in response to a 1 percentage increase in the firm’s cost per unit of output.
An alternative measure for the extent of competition is the PCM. This measure refers to
the firm’s ability to set its prices above its marginal costs. This paper defines PCM at the
industry level as gross profits as a proportion of total sales. Gross profits is value added minus
total wages and the costs of intermediate inputs.
Both competition measures are based on firm level data from PS.
Physical capital
Physical capital is an input factor in the production process that determines output (see equa-
tion (1)). Unfortunately, time series for this type of capital are scarce, particularly at the firm
level. Indeed, as we use an unbalanced panel data set based on a sample, it is very hard to
construct a capital input measure for each firm in the data set as firms are not present in all
consecutive years. Therefore, we employ an alternative indicator at the industry level. We
aggregate all the depreciation expenditures within an industry. In fact, we use the depreciation
rate (i.e. depreciation expenditures over gross value added) as measure for the capital intensity
as can be deducted from equation (4). Figures originate from PS.
Non-technological innovations
Non-technological innovations in CIS are defined as changes in strategy, management, orga-
nization, or marketing. This type of innovation can enhance the performance of a firm or an
industry. Particularly, firms may realize higher productivity gains if they simultaneously do
technological and non-technological innovations (see Hempell, van Leeuwen and van der Wiel
(2004)) than doing either technological or non technological innovation suggesting that those
innovations are complementary. Put differently, technological innovations might be a necessary
condition for improving the performance of a firm, but not a sufficient condition.
CIS provides only discrete data (yes or no) and no data on outlays for non technological
innovations. We employ the percentage of firms (as percentage of total number of firms in an
industry) that implement a non-technological innovation.
Distance to the frontier
The distance to the frontier (g) can be a determinant for productivity as explained in section
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2. Due to data availability, for this study we limit ourselves to data for the Netherlands.28
In theory, the highest productivity level of all firms in a given Dutch industry represents the
(national) frontier. However, defined in such way this definition for the frontier is very sensitive
to the presence of outliers in the data. To reduce this sensitivity, we look at the highest quartile
in the labor productivity distribution in each 3-digit SIC class instead of the highest single labor
productivity level of one particular firm in that industry. The productivity level of these firms
in this quartile will be taken as the frontier and this level is related to the average productivity
level of the industry to measure the (average) distance to the technological frontier. We expect
positive estimated coefficients for g, including the interaction terms that captures the second
face of R&D.
Cooperation
This explanatory variable comes from CIS. Firms are asked whether or not they cooperate
with other firms with respect to their innovation activity. The variable we use is defined as the
percentage of firms (as percentage of total number of firms) that reported cooperation.
Efficiency difference
As discussed in section 3.2, we want to test the importance of within industry variation. More
precisely, we use the variance in average variable costs (variable costs over revenues) as indicator
for differences in (cost) efficiency. Variable costs include wages and costs for intermediate inputs.
If the variance is low, it points to small differences in performance across firms.
To some extent, this indicator is comparable to the variable that measures the distance
to the frontier as they both measure differences within an industry. High values for both
indicates large variation. But two distinctions are the following. First, this measure of efficiency
difference uses the average variable costs, whereas the distance to the frontier is based on labor
productivity. Second, if the distribution of the average variable costs is not normal (so not
bell-shaped, with a peak at the mean) then these measures may provide different information.
Relatively low variance can go together with a relatively large gap. Ignoring statistical outliers
due to measurement issues, this means that most firms in this particular industry are relatively
28Ideally, the global technological frontier is needed for our analysis to incorporate the idea of the distance to
the frontier as potential determinant for higher productivity. The global frontier can be defined as the highest
productivity level of an individual firm in the world. This definition is not feasible in practice, because we do
not have worldwide micro data at our disposal.
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inefficient, while a limited number of firms are relatively efficient.
Funding
A government subsidy such as a R&D subsidy aims to stimulate innovation. Such subsidies
reduce the innovation costs and help to internalize externalities. Our variable is based on the
question in CIS whether or not the firm received a subsidy for its innovation activities. We use
a ratio: the number of firms receiving a subsidy over the total number of firms (including non
innovative firms) in the 3/4 digit SIC-code.29
Advertising costs
Advertisement expenses can form an entry barrier (see Sutton (1991)). For example, high
advertisement expenditures may signal to potential entrants that they need a lot of advertise-
ment to promote their products. However, high advertisement costs can also be a sign of intense
competition in an industry (see e.g., Creusen, Minne and van der Wiel (2006a)). Through ad-
vertising firms try to make their products known to people, more transparent (i.e. promoting
its features), so consumers will buy their product instead of products of their competitors. This
indicator, expressed as ratio advertising costs over revenues, is derived from PS.
Cost disadvantage ratio
The cost disadvantage ratio is an indicator for entry barriers caused by economies of scale.30
Economies of scale act as an entry barrier for new firms to enter the market if small firms have
a cost disadvantage compared to big firms.
The cost disadvantage ratio in this paper is defined as the ratio between the market shares
of small and medium firms and the market shares of the large firms. More precisely, it is the
ratio of the average labor productivity (defined as value added per worker) of the smallest firms
responsible for 50 percent of the turnover in a market over the average labor productivity of
the largest firms responsible for the remaining 50 percent of the turnover in a market. A low
level of this ratio indicates economies of scale. This ratio comes from PS.
Turbulence
29We do not have (sufficient) data on the amount of innovation subsidies.
30Nonetheless, prudence is called when using this indicator. Firms could also produce higher output in case
of constant returns to scale because those firms are more efficient.
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The turbulence indicator is defined as the number of firms that actually enter plus the number
of firms that actually exit an industry related to the overall number of firms active in this
industry. Although not necessarily directly related to competition, a high level of turbulence
indicates that there are a lot of firms entering and/or leaving the market reflecting intense
competition. This indicator is based on data from the General Business Register (ABR).
GDP
We use the change in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the competition equation as
a crude proxy for an increase in market demand.31 The idea is that in a booming economy,
demand (temporarily) exceeds supply. Then competing firms can set their prices above marginal
cost and gain high profits without being impeded by competitors’ price-cutting. Hence, excess
demand is expected to weaken competition among firms. This GDP-measure (we use the index)
is based on data from the National Accounts of Statistics Netherlands.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Total economy
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Innovation intensity 1210 3.782 9.345 0.000 222.100
Competition (PE) 1179 5.341 3.781 -1.140 38.823
Labor productivity 1179 84.300 108.436 10.860 1044.185
Efficiency difference 1179 0.018 0.012 0.001 0.085
Non-technological innovations 1210 0.410 0.202 0.000 1.000
Log capital intensity 1179 1.715 0.827 -0.999 6.049
Number of employees 1179 17830 31217 45 249267
Turbulence 980 0.150 0.065 -0.005 0.529
Advertising costs 1027 0.009 0.013 0.000 0.127
Disadvantage ratio 1179 0.788 0.919 -14.640 18.879
GDP index 1207 131.553 7.286 115.103 142.276
Distance to frontier 1197 0.041 0.291 -2.138 1.125
Cooperation 1210 0.163 0.144 0.000 0.811
Funding 1210 0.175 0.184 0.000 1.000
Note: Based on regression sample for equation (6).
31We have no aggregate data for industry revenues per 3 digit industry. Moreover, such data probably
enhances endogeneity issues more than using GDP.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Manufacturing
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Innovation intensity 745 5.430 11.520 0.009 222.100
Competition (PE) 738 6.632 3.934 -0.043 38.823
Labor productivity 738 64.586 46.800 18.197 537.201
Efficiency difference 738 0.014 0.009 0.001 0.065
Non-technological innovations 745 0.475 0.195 0.000 1.000
Log capital intensity 738 1.896 0.681 -0.435 4.650
Number of employees 738 6936 8237 105 55612
Turbulence 660 0.132 0.054 -0.005 0.450
Advertising costs 666 0.009 0.012 0.000 0.125
Disadvantage ratio 738 0.856 0.933 -6.293 18.879
Distance to frontier 743 0.014 0.300 -2.138 1.125
Cooperation 745 0.216 0.150 0.000 0.811
Funding 745 0.259 0.186 0.000 1.000
Note: Based on regression sample for equation (6).
4.3. Descriptive statistics
Tables 1 to 3 show descriptive statistics of the key variables we want to use in section 5. We
present figures for the total economy, but also for manufacturing and services. We distinguish
between these two sectors as there might be differences between manufacturing and services.
For instance, industries in manufacturing are often more exposed to foreign competition than
industries in services (e.g.metal industry versus retail trade).32 Indeed, Creusen, Minne and
van der Wiel (2006b) find evidence for the Netherlands that competition is stronger in the man-
ufacturing industry than in services. Additionally, the exact meaning of innovation activities
is less clear in services than in manufacturing. For example, innovation in services tends to be
organizational or client oriented rather than of a technological nature which is less difficult to
define and measure.
Comparing the descriptive statistic of tables 1 – 3, there are substantial differences between
both sectors. Despite the fact that the innovation intensity, level of competition, funding, co-
32Exceptions are transport and aviation.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Services
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Innovation intensity 465 1.143 1.848 0.000 22.483
Competition (PE) 441 3.180 2.208 -1.140 14.117
Labor productivity 441 117.290 161.459 10.860 1044.185
Efficiency difference 441 0.025 0.013 0.001 0.085
Non-technological innovations 465 0.306 0.168 0.000 0.842
Log capital intensity 441 1.414 0.952 -0.999 6.049
Number of employees 441 36060 44307 45 249267
Turbulence 320 0.188 0.068 0.056 0.529
Advertising costs 361 0.008 0.014 0.000 0.127
Disadvantage ratio 441 0.675 0.885 -14.640 5.716
Distance to frontier 454 0.085 0.272 -0.819 0.903
Cooperation 465 0.076 0.079 0.000 0.528
Funding 465 0.041 0.057 0.000 0.421
Note: Based on regression sample for equation (6).
operation and capital intensity are all higher in the manufacturing industry, labor productivity
is higher in services, particularly in wholesale trade, renting of automobiles and other transport
equipment. Differences in the remaining variables are less pronounced between the manufac-
turing industry and the services sector. With respect to labor productivity and its key drivers,
variances within the services sector are larger for labor productivity and capital intensity, but
smaller for the innovation intensity and competition (according to the standard deviation).33
Finally, we correlate our indicator for efficiency differences (i.e. the variance of variable average
costs) within an industry with the degree of competition to check whether the prediction of
Aghion et al. (2005) is visible using simple correlations. They argue that the share of neck-
33We obtain negative results for turbulence, disadvantage ratio and distance to frontier. These observations
do not affect the estimates because there are only a few of them. The explanation for these observations are as
follows. The disadvantage ratio can be negative if the value added for an industry is negative. The distance to
the frontier can become negative if the distribution of firms has a long tail where the average labor productivity
is larger than that of the 75th percentile. The negative result for turbulence is due to data problems related to
a lack of consistent time series.
26
and-neck industries (small variance of costs) will decline as competition increases. Translated
to our situation, one would expect a positive correlation: more competition goes together with
larger variances in variable costs suggesting less neck-and-neck industries. Figure 1 shows the
result. We find a negative correlation, suggesting that the prediction of Aghion et al. (2005)
is not right. A possible explanation for our finding is that as competition increases, inefficient
firms leave the market and that reduces the variance. In the next section, we put the prediction
of Aghion et al. (2005) to a further test taking account of other variables including industry
and time fixed effects that might distort this correlation.



































This section begins with addressing the research question to what extent competition and in-
novation enhance the productivity performance in the Netherlands.34 Our starting point is
equation (6) where we relate labor productivity to competition, innovation, distance to the
34Results not reported in this section are available on request.
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frontier, capital intensity and economies of scale.35 As discussed in section 3 other explanatory
variables captured by the control vector X may also contribute to a better productivity perfor-
mance (i.e. higher TFP). Therefore, we tested other variables, but they were not significant. For
instance, we added to our specification the following explanatory variables: non-technological
innovations, the variance of efficiency, the interaction between non-technological innovation
and innovation intensity, and the interaction between the variance in efficiency and innovation
intensity.
Table 4 presents the econometric results with respect to the estimated labor productivity
equation.36 As discussed, we are particularly interested in the underlying sources of TFP. In
general, these findings provide mixed evidence of explaining TFP-growth.
First, we discuss the impact of innovation and competition on productivity. Both explana-
tory variables seem to be drivers of productivity growth, at least for the total economy. Our
empirical results confirm the assertion that competition may directly stimulate firms to attain
higher productivity levels by reducing X-inefficiencies and/or removing inefficient firms. This
is the case in columns (1) to (4), but not for services. In addition, the general idea that inno-
vation is an important driver behind productivity growth is supported as well (see column 1).
However, this result is not statistically significant if we control for other regressors. This result
is in line with van der Wiel et al. (2008), who also did not find a significantly positive effect of
R&D on the growth of TFP for the Netherlands. A reason for this finding could be that part
of the (process) innovation is embodied in physical capital, already picked up by our capital
intensity indicator.
Next, we do not find support for the view that the distance to the frontier itself acts as a
driver of productivity at the industry level due to ‘costless’ technology transfers. Remarkably,
the interaction of this variable with competition has a negative (but very limited) effect on
productivity, suggesting the Schumpeterian effect dominates. More competition seems to induce
35As we estimate our equations in first differences unobserved industry heterogeneity is controlled for as long
as this unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time.
36The tables report two tests: the Hansen’s J statistic and the GMM S statistics. The former tests the validity
of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. We find p-values larger than
0.05 in all cases, so our instruments are both relevant and valid. The p-value of the GMM S statistics is in
almost all cases larger than 0.05, implicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our variables are
exogenous. One exception is variant 1 in table 4. Finally, we use the robust standard errors to calculate the
t-values in all tables.
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Table 4: Labor productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Explanatory variables Total Total Total Manufact. Services
Competition (-1) 0.0129*** 0.00979** 0.0106*** 0.0141*** 0.00942
(3.14) (2.23) (2.85) (4.04) (0.94)
Innovation intensity (-1) 0.00358** 0.00229 0.00133 0.000909 0.00144
(1.98) (1.53) (0.81) (0.48) (0.19)
Distance Frontier (-1) -0.0309 -0.0242 -0.0394 0.00325
(-1.07) (-0.57) (-0.45) (0.08)
Distance Frontier*comp (-1) -0.0266* -0.0390*** -0.0469
(-1.65) (-2.72) (-0.90)
Distance Frontier*innov (-1) -0.00341 -0.00370 -0.0129
(-0.37) (-0.28) (-0.51)
Log capital intensity (-1) 0.291*** 0.301*** 0.274*** 0.258***
(9.47) (9.72) (8.46) (5.25)
Economies of scale (-1) -0.0188 -0.0124 0.0188 -0.155***
(-0.82) (-0.54) (0.70) (-4.75)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies No No No No No
Hansen’s J 0.6969 0.5098 0.3198 0.3001 0.3107
GMM C statistic 0.0396 0.6585 0.7991 0.5345 0.7330
Observations 1005 759 759 498 261
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The values reported for the Hansen’s
J test are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for GMM C (difference-
in-Sargan test) statistics are the p-values for the null hypothesis whether variables are exogenous.
firms to abstain from technology transfers from the global frontier. Apparently, the costs of
imitating global technologies are too high and they cannot be recovered in times of fierce
competition. Another explanation is that with intense competition there might be less spillovers
available as firms (in other countries) are more inclined to keep their information secret.
As expected, capital intensity positively and significantly correlates with labor productivity
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in all cases. With regard to the existence of economies of scale, although not significant, the
results are in line with what is found in the literature. There is one exception, the coefficient
is negative and significantly different from zero for services, suggesting substantial decreasing
economies of scale on average.37
To conclude, we find evidence for a positive effect of competition on productivity, whereas the
positive coefficient for innovation is weakly significant. These are partial effects of competition
and innovation. Which of these two sources eventually drives productivity is to be determined.
We consider next the effect of competition on innovation. After that, we take into account that
innovation can also influence competition.
5.2. Explaining innovation
We start with explaining innovation using equation (7). For the control variable W we include
the following explanatory variables: distance to the frontier, cooperation, efficiency difference
and funding. Table 5 shows the results for the total Dutch economy (see column 1-3), manu-
facturing (column 4) and services (column 5) respectively.
Starting with the results for the total Dutch economy, table 5 clearly illustrates that it
matters whether one takes into account other explanatory variables for innovation. In terms of
variables used, columns (1) and (2) are to a large extent directly comparable to the approach
of Aghion et al. (2005), whereas column (3) shows the results of equation (7) when one also
includes other explanatory variables that might affect innovation. Aghion et al. (2005) use only
competition, competition squared and year effects in their regressions, but ignore the potential
impact of other determinants.38
Ignoring non-linearity, we find a positive and significant impact of competition on innovation
(see column (1)). Extending our analysis and taking account of non-linearity, we do not find
significant evidence for an inverted U-curve relationship between competition and innovation
for the Netherlands when neglecting other explanatory variables (see column (2)). However,
conditional on those other variables, we come up with a statistically significant inverted U-curve
37This is in contrast with findings of Kox, van Leeuwen and van der Wiel (2010), but they limit their analysis
to the (European) business services. Moreover, they differentiate within industries and find increasing returns
to scale but mainly for small firms.
38They use other determinants but these determinants are only included as instruments for competition coping
with the endogeneity problem (i.e. policy instruments (see section 3.3) and other instruments like import rate).
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Table 5: Innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Explanatory variables Total Total Total Manufacturing Services
Competition (-1) 0.677* -0.113 0.198** 0.175* -0.120
(1.88) (-0.18) (2.08) (1.67) (-0.64)
Competition (-1) squared 0.0271 -0.00696** -0.00652* 0.0160
(0.90) (-2.31) (-1.94) (0.84)
Distance to frontier (-1) 0.180 0.291 -0.314
(0.59) (0.74) (-1.40)
Cooperation (-1) 0.978 0.565 0.449
(0.57) (0.30) (0.27)
Efficiency difference (-1) 6.574 1.453 7.971*
(0.73) (0.12) (1.62)
Funding (-1) -0.213 -0.309 -0.363
(-0.19) (-0.25) (-0.14)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies No No No No No
Hansen’s J 0.9683 0.7138 0.6332 0.5850 0.9438
GMM C statistic 0.0911 0.5109 0.3808 0.5051 0.2750
Observations 1210 1210 822 558 264
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The values reported for the Hansen’s
J test are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for GMM C (difference-
in-Sargan test) statistics are the p-values for the null hypothesis whether variables are exogenous.
(see column (3)). So, more competition initially leads to higher innovation and then to lower
innovation expenditures per employee.39 Looking at the data more closely, it turns out that 3
percent of the observations have competition intensities beyond the innovation maximizing level,
mainly located in the manufacturing industry. Therefore, differentiating between manufacturing
39Notice that this result could be related to a different sample as the number of observations differs between
column (2) and column (3) of table 5. This different sample is due to missing observations for the other
explanatory variables. We checked for this argument. The inverted U-curve is also present if we run the variant
reported in column (2) on the smaller sample, yet the shape is less steep.
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and services, it turns out that this macro finding rests upon the conditions in the manufacturing
industry. There is no evidence for an inverted U-curve in Dutch services, whereas the outcome
for the Dutch manufacturing is significant at the 10 percent significance level.40 The latter
corresponds with Aghion et al. (2005) as they only analyzed UK manufacturing.
The coefficients of the other explanatory variables are not significant, except for the in-
dicator on differences in efficiency within an industry.41 This indicator correlates positively
and significantly with the innovation intensity for services at the 10 percent confidence level.
So high variance in variable costs correlates with more innovation, while one would expect a
negative correlation: firms innovate to escape their competitors that have more or less the
same efficiency level. An explanation for this finding might be that lagging firms in services
still have enough incentives to catch up due to low levels of competition in this sector of the
economy. The descriptive statistics show that competition is less intense in services than in
manufacturing. Appendix B contains additional estimations where we consider a subsample of
our data investigating the theoretical predication in Aghion et al. (2005) that the inverted U
shape relationship between competition and innovation should be steeper in more neck-and-
neck industries (i.e. industries with less variance in costs or industries closer to frontier). This
prediction is, however, not consistent with our data.
The absence of significant determinants explaining innovation in services underlines the
common view that innovation is hard to measure in services, even with the availability of CIS.
Interestingly from a policy perspective, we do not find evidence for a positive impact of an
innovation subsidy to stimulate innovation. The coefficient of funding is not significant at any
confidence interval. This finding suggests that if we distinguish between stimulating innovation
by either competition or by innovation subsidies then it makes more sense for policy makers to
use the former as this policy option appears to be the most promising one.
Apparently, competition is the most important determinant of innovation and this determinant
is not always conducive to the innovation expenditures. Taking the outcome for manufacturing,
the competition intensity in terms of PE that maximizes the innovation level is approximately
40Our results for services are in line with Creusen, Vroomen, van der Wiel and Kuypers (2006). They found
no evidence for an inverted U in the Dutch retail trade.
41We tested also non technological innovations as additional control variable, but this variable was not sig-
nificant either.
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13. This implicates that ten percent of the manufacturing industries operated at least one year
beyond this maximal level in the period 1996-2006. When competition becomes too fierce it may
therefore have a negative effect on productivity via lower innovation expenditures. However,
combining the estimation results presented in table 4 and table 5 by replacing innovation
for competition and other explanatory variabels in the labour productivity equation, it turns
out that this negative effect is at levels of competition that are far beyond levels observed in
general.42 Hence when it comes to productivity, more intense competition is always better.43
5.3. Explaining competition
After examining whether competition affects the size of innovation expenditures, this subsection
investigates this causality the other way round by estimating equation (8).
The idea behind this alternative channel from innovation to competition is that (product)
innovation leads to more product variety (or more product differentiation). This creates (new)
niches in markets with lower intensity of competition as a consequence (see also Boone (2000b)).
Or, high levels of innovation expenditures form an entry barrier reducing the degree of com-
petitive pressure (see Sutton (1991)). GDP, the disadvantage ratio, turbulence indicator (i.e.
the ratio of death and birth of enterprizes over the number of active enterprizes in an industry)
and advertising costs are included as control variables into equation (8).
Table 6 presents the results for five variants. For both the total economy (columns 1-3) and
services (column 5), the empirical evidence for this feedback mechanism from innovation back
to competition appears to be absent.44 But in manufacturing, this mechanism is present and
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Hence, more innovation will initially lead to more
intense competition, but beyond some level of innovation, more innovation expenditures will
have a negative effect on measured competition in the Dutch manufacturing industry. Looking
at our data set, this happens occasionally. It turns out that there were three manufacturing
42For the total economy, this level of PE is almost 600, and for the manufacturing industry with 1200 even
much higher.
43Estimation of the reduced form of the labor productivity equation supports these findings for a large range
of PE values.
44It can be argued that longer time lags than one year are needed for this channel because innovation will
not directly have implications for the intensity of competition. Due to the limited number of observations we
cannot take more lags into consideration without losing significance.
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Table 6: Competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Explanatory variables Total Total Total Manufacturing Services
Innovation intensity (-1) -0.0671 -0.0112 0.300 0.506** -0.358
(-1.25) (-0.12) (1.62) (2.50) (-1.57)
Innovation intensity (-1) squared -0.000260 -0.00209* -0.00341** 0.0126
(-0.49) (-1.72) (-2.57) (0.54)
GDP (-1) -0.00509 0.0216 -0.0442
(-0.07) (0.22) (-0.90)
Disadvantage ratio (-1) -0.505 -0.618 0.174
(-1.34) (-1.59) (1.37)
Turbulence (-1) 3.116 1.662 7.212**
(0.79) (0.36) (2.44)
Advertising costs (-1) -32.52 -29.48 -30.52**
(-1.47) (-1.00) (-2.18)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies No No No No No
Hansen’s J 0.6013 0.6551 0.6942 0.6515 0.9336
GMM C statistic 0.3369 0.4171 0.5300 0.4348 0.0456
Observations 944 944 696 433 263
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The values reported for the Hansen’s
J test are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for GMM C (difference-
in-Sargan test) statistics are the p-values for the null hypothesis whether variables are exogenous.
industries that were beyond this level in the period 1996-2006.45 These industries consist of
a relatively small number of firms. So, these industries are concentrated and entry might be
hindered due to high levels of innovation that act as entry barrier.
Looking at the other explanatory variables, the coefficient of advertising costs is negative
and (weakly) significant for services.46 Apparently, higher advertising costs reduce the intensity
45The industries are: extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas (SIC 111), manufacture of office machinery
and computers (SIC 300) and manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft (SIC 353).
46We also tested an alternative indicator for measuring changes in conduct as explanatory variable for com-
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of competition as these costs are used as strategic weapon to lower product substitutability and
to raise an entry barrier.47 Finally, the coefficient of the turbulence indicator is positive and sig-
nificant at the five percent level for services. Thus, higher turbulence correlates positively with
competition. More entry or more firms leaving the market signals more intense competition.
To wrap up. We find (weak) evidence for the manufacturing industry that beyond some ‘max-
imal’ innovation level there may exist a negative feedback mechanism from innovation to the
development of competition. However, these innovation levels are very high relative to mean
values.
5.4. Robustness of results
Finally, this subsection focuses on the robustness of our findings using PCM as indicator for
competition.48 Our preferred measure for competition is PE. As discussed in Boone et al.
(2007), this indicator is more robust with respect to the development of competition over time
than other traditional indicators like PCM and concentration rates such as H.
At the industry level we find a negative correlation between PCM and PE as one would
expect. Nevertheless, in approximately 40 percent of all observations, PCM suggests a rise (fall)
in competition, whereas PE points to a fall (rise) in competition. Hence, these two competition
measures differ and this may have consequences for our findings if we use PCM instead of PE.
Besides measurement errors, this discrepancy between PCM and PE is due to the reallocation
effect of market shares from inefficient to efficient firms (see Boone et al. (2007)).
To check the robustness of our results for productivity and the inverted U curve, we use PCM
as alternative indicator for competition instead of PE. Tables 7 and 8 report the results of this
petition. Following Creusen, Minne and van der Wiel (2006a), we add a count dummy to the equation that is
based on the knowledge that PE and PCM only differs in the interpretation of the change in competition in
case of a change in conduct (see Boone et al. (2007)). This additional dummy did not differ significantly from
zero in the estimates.
47Remind that in theory, advertising costs may also have a positive impact on competition because it may
increase market transparency.
48PCM is a better measure for competition than H as H will always be wrong in case (inefficient) firms are
forced to leave the industry due to more aggressive behavior by firms (see Boone et al. (2007)). This increase
in H due to more intense competition goes against the traditional interpretation that a fall in H points to more
intense competition.
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Table 7: Labor productivity: Robustness check of PE as competition indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explanatory variable Total Manufact. Services Total Manufact. Services
Innovation intensity (-1) 0.00177 0.000907 0.00291 0.00125 0.000948 0.000602
(1.07) (0.49) (0.41) (0.77) (0.51) (0.08)
PE (-1) 0.00950** 0.0120*** 0.00883
(2.46) (3.49) (0.90)
PCM (-1) -0.389 -0.752 -0.240 -0.0441 -0.149 -0.0267
(-0.96) (-1.39) (-0.62) (-0.14) (-0.37) (-0.08)
Distance Frontier -0.0116 0.0169 0.0196 -0.0110 -0.0185 -0.000850
(-0.26) (0.18) (0.49) (-0.27) (-0.21) (-0.02)
Distance Frontier*comp -0.000863 -0.00467 -0.0355 -0.0196 -0.0242 -0.0434
(-0.04) (-0.25) (-0.70) (-1.12) (-1.42) (-0.82)
Distance Frontier*innov -0.00548 -0.0119 -0.0265 -0.00569 -0.00551 -0.0105
(-0.55) (-0.79) (-1.13) (-0.62) (-0.40) (-0.44)
Log capital intensity (-1) 0.289*** 0.258*** 0.233*** 0.301*** 0.268*** 0.254***
(8.39) (6.98) (5.15) (9.17) (7.89) (5.19)
Economies of scale (-1) -0.0121 0.0217 -0.151*** -0.0114 0.0215 -0.155***
(-0.53) (0.84) (-4.56) (-0.50) (0.83) (-4.62)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies No No No No No No
Hansen’s J 0.6742 0.5807 0.5516 0.2760 0.1881 0.3450
GMM C statistic 0.9473 0.9881 0.2503 0.9708 0.8463 0.7771
Observations 759 498 261 759 498 261
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The values reported for the Hansen’s
J test are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for GMM C
(difference-in-Sargan test) statistics are the p-values for the null hypothesis whether variables are exogenous.
robustness check. Starting with the results for labor productivity in table 7, the coefficients
for PCM are negative in almost all cases as one would expect (i.e. lower PCM signals fiercer
competition and this has a positive effect on productivity). But none of these coefficients are
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Table 8: Innovation: Robustness check of PE as competition indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Explanatory variable Total Total Total Manufacturing Services
PCM (-1) -1.676 -6.132 -21.47 -22.91 -7.697
(-0.17) (-0.19) (-1.19) (-0.86) (-0.57)
PCM (-1) squared 12.40 31.63 65.15 7.362
(0.22) (1.22) (1.04) (0.47)
Distance to frontier (-1) -0.0329 0.112 -0.177
(-0.10) (0.27) (-0.60)
Cooperation (-1) -0.227 -2.066 0.623
(-0.13) (-1.00) (0.34)
Efficiency difference (-1) -1.361 -40.22** 12.26*
(-0.07) (-2.22) (1.72)
Funding (-1) -0.145 0.275 -0.00618
(-0.13) (0.22) (-0.00)
Hansen’s J 0.7750 0.7823 0.6698 0.5877 0.9860
GMM C statistic 0.7219 0.7499 0.1307 0.1326 0.5343
Observations 1201 1201 820 558 262
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The values reported for the Hansen’s
J test are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for GMM C (difference-
in-Sargan test) statistics are the p-values for the null hypothesis whether variables are exogenous.
significant at the ten percent significance level. Concerning innovation in table 8, the coefficients
for PCM are not statistically significant either.
What do these findings mean? If only industry aggregate data are available, researchers can
only use (industry) PCM as measure for competition since the estimation of PE needs firm level
data.49 But, our results show that PCM is not a significant explanatory variable for either labor
productivity or innovation intensity at the aggregate level, whereas PE is. This is even the case
when we divide industries into high concentrated industries and low concentrated industries
based on the median of the H. It can be argued that in relatively low concentrated industries
49The PCM measure can be derived from aggregate industry data on revenue and variable costs.
37
PCM should perform better as proxy for competition than in high concentrated industries since
the reallocation effects will be smaller, and hence the potential bias in PCM will be less (see
Boone et al. (2007)). The regression results (not reported) do not support this statement since
PCM is in both cases not a significantly explanatory variable for innovation.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper examines the relationship between competition, innovation and productivity for the
Netherlands. In the theoretical and empirical literature there is no consensus on how competi-
tion affects innovation, and consequently productivity. Recent evidence suggests a non-linear
relation between competition and innovation (see Aghion et al. (2005)) that might, therefore,
have a negative impact on productivity when competition becomes too fierce. However, stud-
ies from Tingvall and Poldahl (2006), but also Aghion et al. (2005) itself, illustrate that the
finding of an inverted-U shaped relation is sensitive to the choice of both the competition and
innovation indicator.
We use industry level data for more than 150 3/4-digit SIC-industries based on aggregated
Dutch firm level data covering almost the whole Dutch economy over the period 1996-2006.
We employ the Profit Elasticity (PE) and innovation expenditures as indicators for competition
and innovation respectively. The PE is a better measure than traditional indicators like con-
centration rates or price cost margins (PCM) for measuring competition (see e.g., Boone et al.
(2007)). Similarly, Brouwer (2007) claims that innovation expenditures are a better concept
in this respect than for instance cited patents that were used in Aghion et al. (2005). Our
model consists of three equations – labor productivity, innovation and competition – that are
estimated using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) and in that way coping with the
endogeneity problem between competition and innovation.
The main findings of our analysis can be summarized as follows. First, we find strong evidence
for a positive impact of competition on total factor productivity (TFP) at the industry level.
Competition directly increases TFP by reducing X-inefficiencies and removing inefficient firms.
Second, this paper finds evidence that there may exist an inverted U-curve between competi-
tion and innovation for the Netherlands, at least for manufacturing industries. This corresponds
with findings of Aghion et al. (2005). Apparently, competition is the most important deter-
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minant of innovation but this determinant is not always conducive to innovation expenditures.
When competition becomes too fierce it may therefore have a negative effect on productivity
via lower innovation expenditures. However, combining all our estimation results, it turns out
that this negative effect is at levels of competition that are far beyond levels observed in gen-
eral. Normally, ten percent higher competition intensity leads on average to 0.1 percent higher
productivity.
Third, we find no evidence for a negative feedback mechanism from innovation back to com-
petition for the aggregate economy. In the sense that high levels of innovation expenditures do
not lead to lower competition intensity. For the manufacturing industry we do find indications
for such a feedback, but this occurs at levels of innovation intensity that are hardly observed
in our data set.
Lastly, as indicator for competition, we use the PE in this study. To test the robustness of
this indicator, we also applied PCM as indicator. The latter turns out to be not significant in
any equation concerning productivity or innovation, making the PE an interesting measure for
future productivity research.
Our findings have implications for policy. Results reveal that the direct effect of more intense
competition appears to increase productivity at the industry level in the Netherlands. But
we also find that there may exist an inverted U-curve between competition and innovation.
Consequently, there might be a trade-off between competition and innovation, and this has
implications for policy makers. Yet, our combined results indicate that an indirect negative
effect of competition on productivity through lower innovation expenditures arises only at very
high levels of competition. Therefore, given current innovation policy intensifying competition
is a promising option for policy makers to raise productivity: one of the main goals for policy
in the Netherlands. Certainly, if we consider our findings for innovation policy. We do not find
significant econometric evidence that our indicator for innovation subsidies positively affects
innovation expenditures. The findings with respect to competition are in line with Kocsis et al.
(2009) as they argue that an inverse U relationship between competition and innovation can
go together with a positive effect of competition on productivity.
Summarizing the discussion, this paper provides evidence for a new look at the inverted U-curve
between competition and innovation as found by Aghion et al. (2005). We claim that when it
comes to productivity, more intense competition is seemingly always better in the Dutch case.
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Appendix A. Logs or no logs for innovation intensity?
On the one hand, one can assume that the stock of industry knowledge only increases with the
industry’s innovative effort (=I)
Sjt = δSjt−1 + Ijt−1 (A.1)
















, and IR innovation intensity. Then the capital knowledge stock in
equation (3) can be replaced for the innovation intensity.
On the other hand, it is also defendable to use logs (I) in equation (3) instead of the inno-
vation intensity because IR can be part of the production function in a neoclassical framework
in the same way as the other input factors K and L are. Note that then the meaning of a
change in A becomes different as it does not include changes caused by innovation anymore.
Innovation is treated as a separate input variable. We use the former way.
Appendix B. No steeper inverted U due to more neck-and-neckness
Table 9 shows the results for two variants based on a subsample of our data analyzing whether or
not the inverted U between competition and innovation becomes steeper due to more neck-and-
neckness as theoretically predicted by Aghion et al. (2005). This subsample includes industries
with below median differences in average variable costs or below median distance to the frontier.
It is assumed that those industries are more neck-and neck (or leveled) meaning less differences
in applied technology exist between firms. Again, we find an inverted U for both variants,
although not significant for the variant based on distance to the frontier (see column 3). Looking
at the size of the coefficients of competition and competition squared, the theoretical prediction
by Aghion et al. (2005) is, however, not supported because the inverted U relationship between
competition and innovation is not steeper than that in our baseline results for the total economy
(see column 1 versus column 2).
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Table 9: Innovation: robustness checks
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory variables Basic variant Small variance Close to frontier
Competition (-1) 0.198** 0.177* 0.224
(2.08) (1.70) (1.26)
Competition (-1) squared -0.00696** -0.00750** -0.0117
(-2.31) (-1.99) (-1.38)
Distance to frontier (-1) 0.180 1.014 1.236
(0.59) (1.43) (1.28)
Cooperation (-1) 0.978 0.535 2.039
(0.57) (0.24) (0.78)
Efficiency difference (-1) 6.574 15.08 5.490
(0.73) (0.96) (0.45)
Funding (-1) -0.213 -2.631** -1.714
(-0.19) (-2.56) (-0.90)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies No No No
Observations 1090 399 450
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